Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
T he retired population is growing faster than the working population and by the year 2030 one out of every five people will be age 65 and older (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996) . This trend, combined with the current shift in fiscal responsibilities to the states, makes it increasingly important to understand the response of the elderly to differences in state government policy. Like welfare recipients, the absence of a direct linkage between taxes paid and benefits received from government spending may draw the elderly to jurisdictions that provide a certain bundle of goods that are financed with specific types of taxes. The elderly's unique economic situation makes some government expenditures more attractive and some forms of taxation less burdensome than others. In addition, their low labor force participation rate suggests that labor market concerns are far less important and makes them potentially quite mobile.
1 Some states, such as Mississippi, which repealed all income taxes on pension income, have recognized this possibility and are using their tax systems to try to become retirement havens (Mackey and Carter, 1994) . Are the elderly sensitive to state policies in making their migration decisions?
This is an important question because the elderly may have a significant impact on the states to which they migrate. The presumption by many is that the arrival of the newly retired elderly is positive for the state. For example, Longino and Crown (1989) , who call retired migrants "pure gold," note that retirement migration boosts private spending, broadens the tax base and improves the economy, particularly the service sector. The elderly's impact on the public sector, however, is less straightforward, especially as they grow older. As discussed in detail by Mackey and Carter (1994) , the elderly enjoy a myriad of tax preferences and therefore tend to pay less in taxes. On the expenditure side, the elderly certainly cost the state less in that they typically have no children to educate. However, a growing share of spending has gone to support the elderly, due mostly to the growth in Medicaid expenditures on long term care (Mackey and Carter, 1994, p. 38) .
2 Finally, the elderly may not only affect state budgets through their tax contributions and demands for public services, but also through the considerable political power they exert. The elderly vote in significantly higher proportions than younger people and may be less supportive of educational (and possibly other) expenditures, especially those elderly who have recently migrated and therefore may lack a strong commitment to their new communities (see, for example, Button, 1992) .
Given the potentially substantial consequences of elderly migration, it is surprising that so few studies have explored whether the elderly are sensitive to state fiscal policies when making their migration decisions.
3 Furthermore, the shortcomings of these studies make for less than credible results, thereby leaving the issue unresolved. Foremost, most fail to control for cost-of-living or fully specify taxes and expenditures; thus it is hard to know what is driving their results. 4 The two studies that do include cost-of-living and a comprehensive set of public sector variables (Clark and Hunter; Houtenville, 1998) use migration rates, therefore missing the critical dynamic of where the individual is moving from. 5, 6 Migration flow data (i.e., how many people migrated from one location to another) permit one to compare the attributes of the original location with those 2 This burden is somewhat mitigated by federal matching funds, which vary by state but cover approximately 50 percent of the costs. 3 Instead, studies of elderly migration tend to emphasize the influence of amenities and cost-of-living, such as Fournier, Rasmussen, and Serow (1988) , Cebula (1993) and Kallan (1993) . Newbold (1996) , and Meyer and Speare (1985) use individual-level data to examine different motives for migration and find that the younger are more likely to be amenity movers. Both neglect cost-of-living as a factor. None of the aforementioned studies evaluate the influence of the public sector on elderly migration. 4 For example, Cebula (1990) represents the public sector with a single dummy variable for whether the state has an income tax or not, which he finds to be statistically significant. Cebula (1974) includes only per capita state and local taxes and the number of public parks per capita, while Cebula and Kohn (1975) include only welfare benefits, per capita nonwelfare spending and per capita property taxes. In addition, these studies fail to consider the cost-of-living, which as demonstrated by Renas and Kumar (1978) and Cebula (Ch. 5, 1979b) , can lead to a substantial bias. 5 Migration rates refer to the number of people who moved into (or, in the case of out-migration, out of) the location, typically divided by the location's population. 6 In addition, a new paper by Duncombe, Robbins, and Wolf (2000) use county-to-county migration flow data.
They essentially treat the county-level flows, combined with the tabulated characteristics of the flows, as individual-level data. They utilize a multinomial logit model to analyze locational choices of the elderly as a function of amenities, and the public sector.
of the destination. 7 Yet of the five studies that use elderly migration flow data, only Voss et. al. (1988) consider the public sector at all and even they include only one fiscal variable, the death tax. 8 In addition, none investigate the net flow of elderly individuals, which is perhaps of greater interest to policymakers. Finally, no study has considered alternative ways of representing the public sector.
Our empirical analysis attempts to correct these shortcomings. We are the first to include a full representation of the public sector in an elderly migration flow study and to consider both gross and net flows. Our theoretical framework reveals how difficult it is to capture the tax side when using aggregate data, and so we experiment with three alternative measures. Our econometric analysis offers advances as well, and our extensive sensitivity analyses give us added confidence in our results. What emerges is a clearer and more credible picture of how the elderly respond to state fiscal policies when making their migration decisions.
MODELING STATE-TO-STATE ELDERLY MIGRATION FLOWS
Although past studies make broad references to utility-maximizing behavior and Tiebout, all but Dresher (1994) and Conway and Houtenville (1998) lack a formal theoretical model. Building on these two papers, we present a simple yet general model that clarifies the role of amenities, cost-of-living, government spending, and taxes in elderly migration, as well as the standard "gravity model" variables of population and distance. Migrants are assumed to be utility-maximizers who choose between locations that differ across these variables. Government spending 9 and amenities provide utility, but these nontraded goods come at a cost -taxes and higher rents/lower wages, respectively. As noted earlier, however, the elderly may be able to avoid some taxes more easily than others and the retired elderly are not harmed by lower wages. Higher rents and lower wages also affect the general cost-of-living.
Given location i, the elderly individual's utility-maximizing problem is:
where X is a composite consumption good which includes housing for simplicity, B is bequests, A is a vector of amenities, and G is a vector of government provided 7 Individual-level data could also permit this. The most thorough study of Tiebout elderly migration to use individual-level data is Dresher (1994) , who uses data from the PSID and county-and state-level characteristics to estimate individuals' decisions to move with a conditional logit model. Her representation of the public sector is also incomplete because she aggregates all expenditures into one variable, total state and local spending per capita, which interestingly is the one fiscal variable that is consistently important. We are grateful to James Walker for bringing this dissertation to our attention. 8 Three migration flow studies include a general measure of taxes only as a proxy for or as part of a cost-ofliving index (McLeod, Parker, Serow, and Rives, 1984; Serow, Charity, Fournier, and Rasmussen, 1986; and Fournier, Rasmussen, and Serow, 1988) . The remaining one, Conway and Houtenville (1999) , uses elderly migration flows only as an application of their econometric technique. We use their technique and discuss it in more detail in the Technical Appendix, which is available upon request. 9 Specifically, government-provided goods are what affect utility; however, because all we have available is government expenditures we use government spending and government provided goods interchangeably. In addition, we use per capita government spending, which is consistent either with the government provided good being "private" or with the government providing the first-best quantity of the good such that the marginal utility of the good to each citizen is on average 1/n, where n is population.
goods. We assume the individual is retired and thus income (Y) and initial wealth (W 0 ) are invariant to location. 10 Income taxes, T Y , are a complex function of income, wealth and other taxes paid (like property taxes). The price of the composite good or the general cost-of-living, P X , is influenced by the level of amenities (through wages and rents), and T X is a function that reflects the many taxes on goods (e.g., sales, property). Death taxes (T D ) affect bequests, as does end-of-period wealth (W i ). Substituting the utilitymaximizing values for X i and W i into the utility function yields the indirect utility at location i,
where T denotes the vector of taxes (income, death, and other) and for each tax is not a rate or per unit amount, but rather the parameters of its tax function. What is the best way to represent these functions empirically, especially with aggregate data? Therein lies our reason for using three alternative tax sets.
The elderly individual then compares utility at location i to that which could be achieved at any other location j, minus the psychic and economic costs of moving. The net benefit of moving from i to j is thus
where C ij is the cost of moving from i to j and is a function of the distance between the two locations, d ij , and whether they share a border, b ij . The individual migrates if any, e ij , is greater than zero and chooses the location for which e ij is highest. Equation [3] also reveals why a variable at the destination is expected to have the opposite effect of one at the origin.
We do not observe e ij or even whether it is positive for a certain individual. Instead, we observe the gross flow, F ij , which is the number of individuals who move from i to j and can be interpreted as the number of times that e ij is positive and greater than all other e ik 's. Of course, F ij is also going to be a function of the population of the two locations as higher populated areas should experience more out-migration and in-migration. This leads to our basic model specification:
for i = (1,...,m) origin states, and j = (1,..., i -1, i + 1,...m) destination states, and P X is replaced with our empirical measure, the cost-of-living or COL. 11 If there is no migration from state i to state j (F ij = 0), then the natural log is set to zero. 12 We also estimate equation [4] using the log of the net flow (ln(F ij -F ji )). Note that using net flows eliminates half of the observations, which we accomplish by omitting all negative net flows. The superscripts denote whether it is referring to the origin or destination.
The last three terms in equation [4] are disturbance terms, which necessitate a more sophisticated technique than ordi-10 Because our intent is to provide a simple theoretical framework that guides our empirical analysis, we simplify by assuming a one-period model. 11 See for example Fields (1979, p. 22-23) for a derivation of this general functional form. All five elderly migration flow studies use this same functional form. 12 We also explore omitting these observations from the sample or treating them as censored observations via Tobit.
nary least squares (OLS). Conway and Houtenville (1999) Conway and Houtenville (1999) also discuss how these two random effects are likely correlated for the same state-the unobserved influences that cause people to leave Alabama are likely correlated with those that draw people to Alabama. They devise a two-step estimator for this model, in the spirit of Amemiya (1978) and Borjas and Sueyoshi (1994) , that we use in our analysis. Their application to a simple elderly migration flow model (without public sector variables) shows that failing to include random effects biases the estimated standard errors downward, thereby inflating the significance of the state-specific variables. This is the precise point made by Moulton (1986) .
A second complication is that either the group effects or the white noise error (ε and µ, respectively, in equation [4] ) may be heteroskedastic. For example, states with larger populations may not only have larger migration flows but also more variability in those flows. We test for heteroskedasticity in both types of errors and modify Conway and Houtenville's two-step estimator to use White (1980) estimated standard errors.
Note that both the random group effects and the heteroskedasticity only affect the estimated OLS standard errors; the estimated OLS coefficients (β) remain unbiased and consistent. For this reason and the sheer number of specifications we investigate, we only employ the two-step estimator, adjusted for heteroskedasticity, in our main models and instead use OLS to discern any prominent patterns in the coefficients that result from our sensitivity analyses. Table 1 provides a brief description, the source, and the mean and standard deviation of each variable included in equation [4] . In our analysis, the gross flow of elderly individuals (65 and older), F ij , is extracted from the County-to-County Migration Flow Files of the full 1990 U.S. Census. 13 As most studies do, we limit our analysis to the 48 contiguous states, which leaves us with 48 × 47 = 2256 gross migration flows.
DATA DESCRIPTION
Distance between the two locations and the population of each are the typical variables included in a "gravity model" of migration. We measure d ij as the distance ("as the crow flies") between the geographic centers of states i and j; presumably, the psychic and economic costs of a move increase with the distance and so its coefficient (η) should be negative.
14 Our border dummy variable, b ij , controls for 13 Specifically, the variable is constructed by comparing the reported residence in 1985 with the residence reported in 1990. It therefore captures migration that takes place between 1985 and 1990 and has the potentially important shortcoming that it misses some moves (individuals who move more than once in the five year period, especially those who return to the initial state who are therefore viewed as non-movers). Using annual, national data from the Current Population Survey reveals approximately 1.34 million interstate moves between 1985 and 1990 whereas our data yields 1.141 million such moves, suggesting that our data understates the number of moves by about 0.2 million. (Of course, even annual data may miss some moves.) While unfortunate, we can at least take comfort that, for movers, the final destination should dominate the initial origin (otherwise they would have moved back). 14 One might argue that distance between population centers is a superior measure. However, geographic centers have been more commonly used in elderly migration flow studies (used by four out of the five studies), perhaps because the retired elderly are not necessarily drawn to the large cities in the same manner that workers are. More importantly, the two distance measures are very highly correlated (with a coefficient of 0.99), so the choice of measure likely has negligible impact. National Tax Journal Vol. 54 no. 1 (March 2001) pp. 103-124 the possibility that information is probably better and the costs of moving lower if the states share a border. 15 In addition, the descriptive analysis at the end of this section clearly reveals the importance of border moves. As Fields (1979) and others note, current population (especially current elderly population) is a function of past migration decisions and could therefore be endogenous. Similarly, past migration patterns are likely to be important (see for example Greenwood, 1975) and Bureau (1995a Bureau ( , 1995b Zahn and Gold (1985, pp. 44-45) . (5,223) 15 For more discussion of the psychic and monetary costs of moving see Sjaastad (1962) and Greenwood (1975) . We argue that border effects are not completely captured by distance; Californians may know more about Oregon than New Hampshire residents know about New Jersey and yet the former are a greater distance apart.
yet are probably endogenous. To avoid this endogeneity yet capture the basic gravity model's features, we include only the total population of the origin and destination states.
Another source of endogeneity is that public sector variables may be determined by migration patterns (Cebula, 1979a) . Once individuals have migrated into a state, they become part of an electorate who can place political pressure on elected officials to enact favorable government policies. For this reason we use 1984 values for all of the independent variables. In addition, because our dependent variable refers to a change in residence (and thus migration) between the 1985 and 1990 census interviews, the exact timing of the variables' effect is uncertain. All migrants, even those who migrated in 1985, have access to 1984 information but cannot have directly influenced policies in place before they arrived.
The rest of the explanatory variables come directly from our theoretical model, amenities (A), cost of living (COL), government expenditures (G) and tax variables (T). The amenity and government expenditures variables are exactly the same as those in Conway and Houtenville (1998) . The amenity variables include three measures of climate, heating and cooling degrees and percentage of possible sunshine. Personal safety is also an important amenity to the elderly, so we include the total number of criminal offenses known to police per 100,000 residents. Median household income is included as it may capture both the general standard of living in the state and the fact that a person's tax burden is likely lower the higher other people's income, all things equal. In addition, origin income may act as a proxy for income and initial wealth (Y and W 0 ) in the theoretical model.
Our cost-of-living variable is the index created by Fournier, Rasmusssen, and Serow (1988) specifically for the elderly. 16 We expect a high cost-of-living to cause more out-migration (β COL o > 0) and less inmigration (β COL d < 0), ceteris paribus. An alternative way to include COL in the model is to deflate all the monetary variables by it. We investigate this variation in the next section.
Government expenditures (G) are decomposed into several types, all per capita -education, public welfare, health and hospitals, a measure of Medicaid generosity, and all other expenditures. The first two are probably unattractive to the elderly and thus may increase out-migration and decrease in-migration (β G o > 0 and β G d < 0), if anything, whereas expenditures on health and hospitals should have the opposite effect. As noted earlier, the Medicaid program is potentially important to the elderly. We use the total Medicaid dollars spent on eligible elderly recipients divided by the total number of elderly individuals. This measure encompasses both the breadth of coverage (or eligibility) and the depth of coverage (benefit levels per recipient) by reflecting the average or expected Medicaid payment per elderly individual.
Three Alternative Tax Sets
What is the best way to represent the tax side of the public sector (T)? Higher taxes should be viewed as undesirable, holding expenditures constant, and lead to greater out-migration and lesser in-migration. And yet, the degree to which the elderly are burdened varies across different kinds of taxes. Our three alternative sets of tax variables must capture this fact by disaggregating state tax policy. The first set is that of Conway and Houtenville (1998) expanded to include death taxes.
Their tax variables are tax shares or the percentage of total state and local expenditures financed with each kind of tax and they interpret these shares as the "price" of one dollar's worth of public services. The different tax shares included are state and local property taxes, sales taxes, personal income taxes, death taxes and all other taxes and sources of revenues (except federal aid and interest). Many states exempt portions of pension and social security income from taxation, which suggests that its burden varies systematically across the states. Conway and Houtenville (1998) correct for this by adding an interaction term that is the product of the personal income tax share and the amount of pension income that is exempt. Likewise, many state sales taxes exempt food purchased for home consumption and so we add to the Conway and Houtenville set an additional interaction term that is the product of whether food is exempt and the sales tax share.
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The second set builds on Clark and Hunter (1992) , who include a combination of tax rates and levels. Their variables are per capita property taxes, the marginal income tax rate for a household given median income, marginal death tax rate for a household given median wealth, and all other taxes (excluding property and income taxes) per capita. We improve on these measures by targeting them more directly at the elderly and by including sales tax rates. In particular, we use the median income for elderly households and include exemptions, standard deductions or credits that are granted to the elderly in calculating the marginal income tax rate. 18 We also add the estimated income tax bill for this household as a way of further capturing the tax burden; obviously marginal tax rate alone is an incomplete measure. Likewise, we use the median wealth for elderly households in calculating the marginal death tax rate.
19 Finally, as in the first set, we interact both income tax variables with the amount of exempt pension income and the sales tax variable with whether food is exempt.
The third set expands on Voss et. al. (1988, hereafter VGM (1988) only include the effort index for the death tax. We expand on that by including tax effort indices for property taxes, sales taxes, personal income taxes, and all taxes; the latter attempts to capture all residual taxes. Once again, we interact the amount of exempt pension income with the income tax effort index and whether the state exempts food with the sales tax effort index.
While these three tax variable sets likely provide similar information, they also have important differences. The 17 We choose the food exemption rather than the prescription drug exemption because the latter exhibits so little variability-43 of the 46 states that impose sales taxes exempt prescription drugs. One could argue that the elderly care more about taxes on food than other groups if food expenditures make up a higher proportion of their income, which is likely for individuals who own their homes and live on fixed incomes, or if they tend to eat more meals at home, a more questionable assumption. Furthermore, the elderly do not have to care more about it (or any other tax) than other groups for it to have an effect on their migration decisions. 18 Unfortunately, we were only able to locate this information for 1985. Examining the differences in the exemptions and deductions granted all taxpayers between 1984 and 1985 leads us to believe that using 1985 figures likely has little effect on the results. 19 Ideally, we could also include the death tax bill for the median wealth household. Unfortunately, due to limited information we would have to make many additional assumptions about both the household and the states' tax structures to make such a calculation. In addition, because only 19 states levy any death tax on households with the median level of wealth, the tax bill likely would not add much new information.
Conway and Houtenville set emphasizes the relative importance of each tax to others in that state's system; unlike the other two sets, the overall size of the public sector does not necessarily affect the tax variables. Thus, the size of the public sector should be captured entirely by the government spending variables in that specification, whereas it is picked up by both the expenditure and tax variables in the other two. The variables used in our expanded Clark and Hunter set most closely reflect what the average elderly individual would actually see in his or her budget constraint-a combination of tax rates and estimated tax bills. These variables will be higher in states with larger public sectors. The effort indices (VGM) reflect the burden of each tax relative to its tax base and relative to the rest of the country. A state with a large public sector is likely to have higher collections and therefore a higher effort index, unless it also has an unusually high tax base. In our empirical analysis we hope to discern which description of the tax system is most important in determining elderly migration.
Which States are Gaining and Losing the Elderly?
Before embarking on the econometric analysis, however, we first take a closer look at our dependent variables. As discussed in the introduction, there are two basic ways to describe migration-the number of individuals who move from one state to another (the flow) and the total number of individuals who are moving into or out of a state (in-migration and out-migration, respectively). Although gross flow, F ij , is the typical dependent variable in econometric analyses of flow data, the net flow of elderly from state i to state j (NetF ij = F ij -F ji ) and the net gain or loss to state j, (net j = in-migration j -outmigration j ) may be of greater interest to policymakers. In addition, a persistent puzzle in migration studies is the high correlation between in-migration and out-migration, which is somewhat counterintuitive to the notion that individuals move to maximize utility (e.g., Sjaastad, 1962 and Greenwood, 1975) . 20 We find a high correlation between movements into and out of a state, regardless of whether in-migration and out-migration or inflows and outflows are used.
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This high correlation is the likely culprit in the counterintuitive results found by Conway and Houtenville (1998) with migration rate data and by previous elderly migration flow studies, whereby variables affect in-migration and outmigration (or origin and destination) in the same direction. Estimating the model with net flows not only shifts the focus to the more policy-relevant variables, but may also circumvent this "same sign" problem.
Net measures are also useful in examining which states are gaining and losing the elderly. The left panel of Table 2 reports the states with the ten highest and ten lowest net in-migration rates (Net j divided by the elderly population of state j) and numbers (Net j ) for the elderly. The right panel identifies the ten highest net migration flows, NetF ij , again reported as rates and numbers. 22 The flow rate is calculated by dividing NetF ij by the sum of the populations in state i and state j. For the lowest migration flow, we simply list the 38 state pairs with zero net flow. 20 Of course, individuals may have different preferences which is why it is important to limit the analysis to a relatively homogeneous group. 21 Specifically, we find correlations between in-migration and out-migration to be .612 and between inflows and outflows (i.e., F ij and F ji ) to be .812. 22 For example, 44,613 people move from New York to Florida, making it the highest net flow (in terms of numbers); the net flow from Florida to New York is therefore -44,613. We do not report the negative net flows because they are redundant.
The left panel reveals that the biggest "winner" of the elderly is Nevada or Florida, depending on whether one looks at net in-migration rates or numbers. Given the very large elderly population in Florida, this difference between numbers and rates is expected. Otherwise, the top ten states are pretty similar across the two measures and correspond to casual observation-Florida, Nevada, Arizona, the Carolinas, and Georgia draw many of the elderly. Washington and Oregon are also top havens. Looking at the bottom of the left panel, New York is consistently the biggest "loser" of the elderly, regardless of whether rates or numbers of people is considered. New Jersey, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, and California are also consistently big "losers."
The right panel confirms these basic trends. Looking at both flow measures, by far the most frequent move is from New York to Florida, with New Jersey to Florida coming in a distant second. Indeed, Florida is a destination for more than half of the top ten net flows. The remaining top flows consist entirely of border moves, with California being the most common origin. These two trends are what motivate us in our econometric analysis to include a border dummy variable (which most studies omit) and to check the sensitivity of our results to omitting border and Florida-asdestination flows from the sample.
Can states devise policies that attract the elderly? Simple correlations between our state and local fiscal policy measures and net in-migration flows/rates reveal that the elderly tend to avoid states with high per capita government expenditures (especially those pertaining to public welfare and, surprisingly, our measure of elderly Medicaid generosity) and high taxes (especially personal income taxes). 
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KS-RI, ME-TN, ME-UT, MS-ND, MS-RI, MT-RI, MT-VT, NE-NH, NE-RI, NE-VT, ND-WV, RI-SD, RI-UT, RI-WY, SD-VT, TN-WY, MN-VT, MT-WV, OK-RI, MI-SD, MN-MS, MI-ND, MD-NE
, ME-MI, and SD-WA. The last 9 are the result of the flow from state i to state j being perfectly offset by the opposite flow from state j to state i. a Net in-migration divided by the elderly population in that state. b Net in-flow divided by the average of the elderly populations of the two states. 23 We calculate the simple correlation between each of the government spending and tax variables listed in Table 1 and the net migration measures summarized in Table 2 . For the migration flows, we use the difference in these fiscal policy variables between the destination and origin states (as a percentage of the average of the two states). The vast majority of the correlations are negative and about half are statistically significant, especially the VGM and Clark and Hunter tax sets (which are more strongly correlated with the overall size of the public sector).
However, the presence of state government budget constraints makes it hard to discern if it is the high expenditures per se that repel the elderly or whether it is the high taxes required to finance those expenditures that are driving this result. These results cast doubt on past studies that typically include only one or two fiscal variables and underscore the need to include a full representation of the public sector within a multivariate analysis.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We estimate several variations of equation [4] . Our main models are the three alternative sets of tax measures and two different dependent variables, the gross inflow (F ij ) and the net inflow (NetF ij ). First, however, we conduct sensitivity analyses to explore the effects of eliminating observations with undue influence. Dropping Florida-as-destination flows and border moves has virtually no impact on the results. 24 We also check our treatment of zero flows by alternately eliminating them or re-estimating the model using Tobit. Both exercises lead to greater changes than our other sensitivity checks, but most are marginal and very few are systematic. When there is a hypothesis test change or, much less frequently, a sign change, it tends to be common to both specifications (Tobit and eliminating zeros altogether) and to be for the VGM tax set. We also estimate separate regressions for the younger (aged 65-74), middle (75-84) and oldest (85+) elderly. The Rsquareds decline the older the age group, which is consistent with the belief that an amenity migration model should better fit the younger elderly. Although some differences appear, we do not report these regressions for the sake of brevity and instead only note important differences. A final sensitivity check is deflating all monetary variables by COL, which has little impact on the results. Due to their general robustness and for the sake of brevity, we do not report results of the sensitivity analyses.
25 Table 3 reports the results from our six main models, three tax sets for gross flows (the first three columns), and for net inflows (the last three columns), estimated with cross-correlated random effects and adjusted for heteroskedasticity. A few salient results become evident. First is the statistical significance of the origin and destination random effects. How the two are correlated differs between net and gross flows, however. With net flows, they are negatively correlated, as expected (i.e., those unobserved influences that drive people out of state i should also prevent people from entering), but insignificant. With gross flows, we find another manifestation of the "same sign" problem as the two are significantly positively correlated for the same state, as in Conway and Houtenville (1999) . Comparing the crosscorrelated random effects results with those of the (unreported) OLS estimation reveals that controlling for random effects has the expected effect of diminishing the statistical significance of the coefficients, while not changing their signs or general magnitudes. Therefore past elderly migration flow studies, which only use OLS, may overstate the importance of their explanatory variables. Table 3 further reveals the "same sign" problem in that the destination and origin coefficients tend to have the same rather than opposite signs, although less frequently in the net inflow model. While admittedly troubling, this is a widely found result. For instance, all five previous elderly migration flow studies, mentioned earlier, find the same pattern and 24 The estimates for the border-only sample are quite different, with very few statistically significant coefficients. This is to be expected because the border-only sample is so much smaller than the total sample. 25 All results discussed but not reported are available upon request. Dest.
Org.
Dest.
Dest.
Dest. Dest.
Dest. the one study that estimates both in-migration and out-migration equations for the elderly (Conway and Houtenville, 1998) finds coefficients with the same sign. And the pattern is not limited to elderly migration; indeed, the issue of out-migration being positively correlated with inmigration has been discussed for some time now (e.g., Sjaastad, 1962; Greenwood, 1975) . Some of the explanations offered include heterogeneous preferences, unobserved differences in propensities to move, and aggregation, although our focus on the elderly should limit that somewhat. Voss et. al. (1988) offer a lengthy discussion of the problem and suggest that the problem is due to the fundamental positive association between inmigration and out-migration, or "counter-stream migration." They argue that one should find the weaker elasticity to be the coefficient with the wrong sign. Accordingly, we focus not only on the signs of the coefficients, but on their relative magnitude and significance. In addition, net flows should better deal with "counter-stream migration" and be less plagued with this problem, as well as be of greater interest. We therefore emphasize the results from those specifications.
Gravity Model Variables, Cost-of-living, and Amenities
In every specification estimated, the distance, border and population variables have coefficients with the expected signs that are usually statistically significant. Specifically, the migration flow between two states is larger the closer they are, if they share a border, and the larger their populations. The cost-of-living (COL) coefficients also tell a fairly consistent story. The COL in the origin state has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, whereas the destination COL frequently has a negative coefficient and is statistically insignificant. This is exactly as we would expect-the elderly move out of high COL states and, perhaps, into low COL ones. These results are therefore compatible with those found by Fournier et. al. (1988) and Serow et. al. (1986) , who use gross flows and the same COL measure, and Cebula (1993) , who uses net in-migration rates and a less-targeted COL measure. Thus, cost-of-living appears important to elderly migration (much like wages are important to younger people), even when one controls for the public sector. However, we do find the destination COL to be less important than in prior studies. The amenity variables have the "same sign" problem, but tend to tell a reasonable story nonetheless. For instance, while the percentage of sunshine leads to greater out-migration and in-migration (both β o and β d > 0), the destination coefficient is typically larger than the origin coefficient and using net in-flows renders the origin coefficients insignificant. This leaves the intuitive result that states with a high percentage of sunshine are desirable destinations, while sunshine in the origin state appears much less important. Similar results occur with heating degrees and, to a lesser extent, cooling degrees, as having higher heating or cooling degrees makes the state a less desirable destination (β d < 0) and has less of an impact, if any, at the origin. 26 The crime variable, however, produces truly puzzling results in that the destination effect is consistently stronger, suggesting that people are drawn to high crime states. Other studies, such as Fournier, Rasmussen, and Serow (1988) , and Houtenville (1998, 1999) find similar results and attribute them to the noisiness of the crime measure, as the incidence of crime varies a great deal within a state.
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Government Spending
The pattern of origin and destination coefficients having the same sign carries over to the public sector coefficients as well but is again less prevalent in the net flow models. The government spending coefficients are usually negative, with the exception of the residual category. Educational expenditures appear to have an insignificant effect on elderly migration, which makes sense given that we have controlled for taxes. 28 In addition, like crime it tends to vary more within a state and therefore may be harder to capture with state-level data. Health/hospital expenditures have a significantly negative effect, but it is not clear whether the origin or destination effect is stronger. For the gross flows, the origin effect appears to be somewhat stronger, which is consistent with the elderly being hesitant to leave states with good health care systems. However, the net flows suggest that the destination is more important. There is some evidence that this may be due to aggregating the elderly into one category.
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Public welfare is consistently more important at the destination and grows with importance when net flows are used. This 26 Most studies find desirable climate variables important in encouraging in-migration (e.g., Renas and Kumar, 1978; and Cebula, 1990, 1993) and discouraging out-migration (Cebula and Kohn, 1975) . However, our results are consistent with all five elderly migration flow studies, which find that climate has the same effect at the origin and destination and the destination effect is usually stronger (and of the correct sign). 27 Interestingly, Clark and Hunter (1992) also arrive at the same results for their county-level data and speculate that the elderly are attracted to areas with high property value and thus high property crime. 28 In other words, the elderly may derive little utility from education expenditures and may instead react only to the taxes needed to fund them. These results are in contrast to Conway and Houtenville (1998) who find statistically significant, negative coefficients, and to Clark and Hunter (1992) who find that education expenditures increase in-migration. 29 When we stratify the elderly into three age groups (65-74, 75-84 and 85+) and re-estimate our main models, we find that the origin effect always dominates for the two older groups. These two groups are the most likely to be affected.
confirms the findings of Clark and Hunter (1992) and Cebula and Kohn (1975) , suggesting the elderly avoid states with high welfare expenditures. Surprisingly, the Medicaid coefficients display a similar pattern for the gross flows. Perhaps elderly migrants view Medicaid, even for the elderly, as more of a public welfare program than one from which they eventually benefit. However, the significance of Medicaid is greatly diminished by using net inflows. Finally, the residual category, all other expenditures, is the only spending variable with a positive effect on migration and it increases out-migration.
The Tax System
We expect the choice of tax set to have the biggest impact on the tax variable coefficients and that is precisely what we find. Perhaps surprisingly, the only tax instrument to be consistently important across tax sets and gross/net flows is the sales tax exemption for food in the destination. Such an exemption makes a state a more desirable place for the elderly to move, as expected, but has no significant effect on their decisions to leave a state. The sales tax by itself is not important; perhaps this is due to the relatively small variation in sales tax rates so that the bigger impact comes through which items are exempt.
In contrast, the usual suspects-death taxes, property taxes, and even income taxes-exhibit much more sensitivity across the specifications. Death taxes in both the origin and destination states decrease gross migration flows; this is precisely the result found by Voss et. al. (1988) . However, only the Conway and Houtenville tax set yields consistent, intuitive results; high death taxes, like a poor climate, make for an undesirable destination, but have a smaller effect at the origin.
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Property taxes have the opposite effect of increasing gross migration flows. (It is insignificant in the VGM set.) This suggests that the elderly are driven out of high property tax states, as found by Cebula and Kohn (1975) , but are also enticed by high property taxes at their destination. In fact, the destination effect, which is the one that violates our expectations, appears to be the more dominant one, especially when net flows are used. Property taxes therefore behave in the same puzzling manner as the crime variable discussed above, perhaps for the same reason. Property taxes vary a great deal from community to community within a state, just as the crime rate does.
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Personal income taxes and pension exemptions are statistically insignificant for the Conway and Houtenville and VGM tax sets. The Clark and Hunter tax set, which includes estimated income tax bills of elderly median household income and the corresponding marginal income tax rates, yields evidence that the personal income tax is a factor in the elderly's choice of destination. The income tax coefficients show that a high tax bill discourages in-migration and that this effect is tempered by a high exemption for pension income. So the Clark and Hunter specification weakly suggests that states can use their income taxes to attract the elderly. However, the marginal tax rate has a positive effect on in-migration (which is also tempered by an exemption). Perhaps this is because we have already 30 Clark and Hunter (1992) also find that high death taxes discourage in-migration, but the effect is only statistically significant for those aged 50 to 70 years. 31 It is interesting to note that Clark and Hunter (1992) , who use county-level data, finds that high property taxes decrease net in-migration. This suggests that using state-level data could be the culprit, as Conway and Houtenville (1998) find results similar to ours using state-level in-migration and out-migration. Cebula and Kohn (1975) only looked at state-level out-migration rates and therefore could not have uncovered our puzzling results.
controlled for the person's estimated tax burden and the size of the public sector so that it is not clear what the marginal tax rate is capturing. It reflects the progressivity of the income tax, which may be viewed as a positive attribute by some taxpayers and a negative one for others, especially depending on their income.
Which tax set appears to be best? In terms of the gravity model, climate, and government spending variables, there are few big differences between the three. Bigger differences arise for the tax coefficients, and the VGM tax set appears inferior to the other two. The other two tax sets yield more similar results and are probably less noisy and easier to understand. However, two key taxes-death taxes and personal income taxes-are only consistently important for one of the three tax sets. Death taxes seem to matter only in terms of their magnitude relative to other taxes (the Conway and Houtenville tax set). This could also be due to the lack of variation if one uses death tax ratesonly 19 of the 48 states have a nonzero death tax rate for an elderly taxpayer with median wealth. Perhaps the Conway and Houtenville measure better captures the potential for death taxes for the higher income elderly. For the personal income tax it is the parameters of the tax system (i.e., estimated tax bills and marginal tax rates, as in Clark and Hunter) that matter. The complexity and variety of personal income tax systems make it unlikely that a single measure, like tax share or effort index, would adequately capture their effect.
As a final robustness check, we construct two alternative tax sets by replacing the original tax instruments with our favored ones, and then estimate them using gross and net flows. Specifically, the Conway and Houtenville tax set is modified so that the income tax share is replaced with Clark and Hunter's income tax measures; likewise, we replace the death tax rate with the death tax share in the Clark and Hunter tax set. This exercise confirms our original findings; low death taxes and personal income tax bills (tempered by pension exemptions) attract the elderly across all four specifications and the salient findings of the other variables (e.g., COL and welfare) remain intact.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS What can we say, then, about the elderly's decision to move? The strong negative correlation we find between most fiscal variables and net in-migration suggests that including only one or two fiscal variables, as most previous research does, likely (and perhaps erroneously) leads to a significant, negative result. This and the presence of a state budget constraint underscore the need to include a complete representation of the public sector before drawing such a conclusion. Our analysis also reveals some limitations of using state-level data for the elderly. The effects of local-level variables such as crime, education expenditures, and property taxes do not appear to be reliably estimated using state-level migration flows, probably because they all vary so much within the state.
Our salient findings are that the elderly move out of states with a high cost-ofliving and are drawn to states with a sunny, temperate climate. Our results also suggest that states may enjoy some limited success in using their policies to attract the elderly. Surprisingly, it is the sales tax exemption for food that most consistently attracts the elderly. We also find some support for the "usual suspects." Low welfare spending, low death and 32 We estimate these models allowing for cross-correlated random effects and heteroskedasticity. personal income taxes, and exemptions for pension income all make a state a more desirable destination; however, the results for the specific taxes are sensitive to how they are measured. Taken together, our analyses suggest state fiscal policy may affect elderly migration, but not as definitively as several past studies suggest.
The tone of the foregoing discussion presumes, as most studies do, that attracting the elderly is desirable. In our view, this judgement is premature. A comprehensive look at the elderly's effect on state tax revenues and expenditures, taking account of the political influence they may exert on the state's priorities, has not been attempted. 33 Without meaningful estimates of the elderly's costs and benefits, it is impossible to measure precisely the impact of elderly migration and thus determine whether attracting the elderly is a wise policy objective. Such estimates would also aid in the design of federalstate programs targeted at the elderly and seem to us a fruitful avenue for future research.
